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THE UNREGULABLES? THE PERILOUS
CONFLUENCE OF HEDGE FUNDS
AND CREDIT DERIVATIVES
Noah L. Wynkoop*
This Note examines credit derivatives, hedge funds, and the increase in
systemic risk that results from the combination of the two. The issues
considered include what method of regulation-entity, transaction, or self-
regulation-provides the form and amount of disclosure that best addresses
the risk that the markets as a whole will be affected by a financial shock.
Emphasizing the role of traders and efficient capital markets, this Note
proposes that a system of disclosure for derivatives similar to the Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine, or TRACE, system for corporate bonds
would prevent rapid repricings that have the potential to shock the financial
system.
INTRODUCTION
What happens when a Las Vegas gambler "roll[s] the dice"' on a $34.4
trillion2 bet using a "time bomb[] ' '3 as a craps table? The financial world
does not yet know. While investors pour trillions of dollars into hedge
funds and credit derivatives, these entities and transactions remain two of
the least understood elements in today's financial markets. Like any
investment, the return on a hedge fund or credit derivative may be positive
or negative. When an investor gains, the lack of understanding casts a
positive mystique upon these tools. Yet, when an investor loses, and more
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2006, Pennsylvania State
University. I would like to thank Professor Caroline Gentile for her invaluable guidance and
assistance.
1. Melissa Antoszewski, Note, Las Vegas Style Investing: In the Absence of
Regulation, Risky Hedge Fund Bets Can Win Big and Lose Even More, 8 Transactions Tenn.
J. Bus. L. 381, 381 (2007).
2. Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n (ISDA), 2006 Year-End Market Survey,
http://www.isda.org (follow "Surveys & Market Statistics" hyperlink; then follow
"Summaries of Market Survey Results" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter
2006 Year-End Market Survey]. For comparison purposes, the United States' gross
domestic product in 2006 was about $13.2 trillion. World Bank Group, United States Data
Profile, http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=USA
(last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
3. Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 13 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf.
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importantly, when financial markets are disrupted, that mystique turns into
a cry for regulation.
This Note analyzes several available methods of regulation and identifies
the one that can best reduce the systemic risk caused by hedge funds' use of
credit derivatives. Part I defines and explains credit derivatives, hedge
funds, and the systemic risk created by hedge funds' use of credit
derivatives. Part II discusses three possible methods of regulation: (1)
entity regulation, (2) transaction regulation, and (3) self-regulation. Part III
attempts to resolve the conflict over which regulatory method is best suited
to reduce systemic risk and then applies the appropriate regulation to hedge
funds' use of credit derivatives.
I. BACKGROUND
This part provides the building blocks for understanding how hedge
funds' use of credit derivatives increases systemic risk. Part L.A explains
basic credit derivatives, their benefits to the financial markets, and the
current applicable regulation. Part I.B describes hedge funds, their
contributions to the financial markets, and current applicable regulation.
Then, Part I.C provides a working definition of systemic risk, explains how
hedge funds' use of credit derivatives increases systemic risk, and presents
a historical example of the potential effects of not taking regulatory action.
Part I.D explains the efficient capital markets hypothesis as a crucial
consideration in determining the most appropriate method of regulation.
Finally, Part I.E provides a successful example of improved transparency
through disclosure in a market comparable to hedge funds' use of credit
derivatives.
A. Credit Derivatives
Credit risk is the risk that a borrower will not repay its obligation. 4 For
hedge funds (and other financial institutions), this is a significant risk to
which they devote considerable resources to measure and manage.5 In
2006, the ten largest banks in the United States faced about $600 billion of
potential credit risk from their derivatives holdings.6 Traditional methods
of managing counterparty credit risk include "margining and collateral
practices, which are designed to reduce counterparty credit risk in leveraged
4. George Chacko et al., Credit Derivatives: A Primer on Credit Risk, Modeling, and
Instruments 3-4 (2006) (defining credit risk and describing it as a disease that inevitably
infects businesses acting as lenders and borrowers); see also Stephen A. Ross et al.,
Corporate Finance 788 (8th ed. 2008) (using the term default risk to refer to the same risk).
See generally Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 648-65 (8th ed.
2006) (providing an in-depth analysis of credit risk in corporate finance).
5. See John C. Hull, Options, Futures, & Other Derivatives 610 (5th ed. 2003).
6. Timothy F. Geithner, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Global Association
of Risk Professionals 7th Annual Risk Management Convention & Exhibition: Risk
Management Challenges in the U.S. Financial System 5 (2006),
http://www.garp.com/events/GARP2006PostConv/presentation/Geithner.pdf.
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trading by providing a buffer against increased exposure."'7 But in addition
to investors managing this particular risk, just as they do with everything in
today's financial world,8 investors can use credit risk as the basis for
investments: credit derivatives.
1. Overview
The term "credit derivative" encompasses an array of transactions whose
value is determined by an underlying entity's credit worthiness,9 the most
common of which is the credit default swap. l0 The most basic credit
default swap is a contract between two parties in which one party aims to
hedge a specified asset, the reference asset. That party is the protection
buyer and pays a premium, usually over time, to the protection seller in
return for a default payment.11  The default payment is a payment
contingent on the reference entity, the issuer of the reference asset,
experiencing a credit event such as a default. 12  As such, the credit
worthiness of the reference entity is the main driver of the price of the
swap. 13 If a credit event occurs, the contract is terminated and the default
7. John Kambhu et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Hedge Funds, Financial
Intermediation, and Systematic Risk 4 (2007), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr291 .pdf.
8. See, e.g., Brett Nelson, Final Four Tickets at 80% Off, Forbes, Dec. 22, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/home/entrepreneurs/2005/12/21/yoonew-ticketmaster-tickets-
cx.bn_1222yoonew.html (discussing the development of futures contracts to hedge exposure
to sporting event ticket prices).
9. For an explanation of nonstandard credit default swaps, see Hull, supra note 5, at
642-43.
10. See Fin. Insts., Fitch Ratings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Risk Dispersion
Accelerates 1 (2005), available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report frame.cfm?rpt_id=255748 (login
required) (stating that single-name credit default swaps account for two-thirds of all gross
positions sold). Additionally, credit default swaps are being used extensively as building
blocks to create synthetic collateralized debt obligations, an increasingly popular credit
derivative. See David Rule, Bank of Eng., The Credit Derivatives Market: Its Development
and Possible Implications for Financial Stability, Fin. Stability Rev., June 2001, at 117, 140.
11. Chacko et al., supra note 4, at 152-53. For an illustration of a plain vanilla credit
default swap, see Janet M. Tavakoli, Credit Derivatives & Synthetic Structures: A Guide to
Instruments and Applications 78 (2d ed. 2001).
12. Chacko et al., supra note 4, at 152-53; Tavakoli, supra note 11, at 77. Unlike some
other credit derivatives, the protection buyer in a credit default swap does not take on price
risk, i.e., the risk that the underlying asset's price will fall. Id. at 73. Although it is the most
commonly specified, a default is only one defined credit event that can trigger the payment
in a credit default swap. See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust
Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the applicable credit events in
the credit default swap at issue, including failure to pay, obligation acceleration,
repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring); Chacko et al., supra note 4, at 18 (discussing
typical credit events in all financial contracts).
13. The following is an example of a plain vanilla credit default swap: Assume
manufacturing company ABC issues $100 million worth of bonds. A hedge fund believes
the bonds are inexpensive as compared to their default risks and consequently purchases a
very large quantity. Not wanting to be completely exposed to the investment though, the
fund decides to purchase a credit default swap from a large investment bank. In this
contract, the hedge fund is the protection buyer, the bank is the protection seller, and the
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payment is usually paid in one of two ways as set forth in the contract. 14 In
a physical settlement, the protection buyer transfers the reference asset to
the protection seller in exchange for the default payment. 15 In a cash
settlement, the protection buyer keeps the reference asset, but the protection
seller's payment is the "difference between the face value of the reference
asset and its recovery value."' 16
This Note focuses on the over-the-counter credit derivatives market. 17 It
is a noncentralized market composed of individualized, privately negotiated
contracts. 18 Credit default swaps are the most common credit derivative
product. 19 The total notional amount of credit default swaps in the market
was about $34.4 trillion at the end of 2006.20 Furthermore, the annual size
of this market has skyrocketed as the growth in notional amounts
outstanding has been in excess of 100% for the past three years. 21
The use of credit derivatives provides many benefits to the financial
markets and the players within those markets. For investors, both
individuals and firms, one benefit is the ability to achieve payoffs in excess
of those that would otherwise be available from the same level of
investment. 22 This is due to the fact that the protection buyer does not need
to own the reference asset in order to buy protection on it. Another benefit
for investors is the ability to hedge risks associated with a particular
company is the reference entity. The hedge fund pays a premium-the value of which is tied
to the company's credit worthiness-to the bank. If, and only if, the company defaults on
the specific bonds listed in the credit default swap, then the bank will pay the hedge fund the
net loss it suffered as a result of the company's default.
14. Chacko et al., supra note 4, at 153.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Until recently, investors only entered into credit derivatives on an over-the-counter
basis. See, e.g., The Monitor, Banking & Fin. Services Pol'y Rep., Sept. 2007, at 8, 8 (noting
that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange will allow trading of a credit derivative product).
18. See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 677, 678.
19. Ross Barrett & John Ewan, BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2006, at 6 (2006),
available at
http://www.bba.org.uk/content/I/c4/76/7 I/Credit-derivative-report-2006- exec-summary.pdf.
The basic credit default swap is also used extensively as a building block to create synthetic
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Rule, supra note 10, at 140. CDOs are the third
most commonly used credit derivative product, accounting for about sixteen percent of the
market. See Barrett & Ewan, supra, at 6.
20. ISDA, ISDA Market Survey: Notional Amounts Outstanding at Year-End, All
Surveyed Contracts, 1987-Present 1 (2007), available at
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-annual-data.pdf. The "notional
amount" of a derivative refers to an agreed upon amount on which to calculate payments that
is tied to the underlying obligation, not the value of the transaction itself. See JPMorgan
Chase & Co. v. Comm'r, 458 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2006).
21. 2006 Year-End Market Survey, supra note 2.
22. Ren6 M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J. Econ. Persp. 173, 180 (2004).
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company or group of companies. 2 3 Furthermore, an investor can combine
credit derivatives to create almost any desired risk profile.24
For the credit markets, one benefit is the overall distribution of risk
throughout the global infrastructure as parties transfer those risks they are
unwilling to hold.25 As such, it has been argued that credit derivatives can
act as a shock absorber during corporate crises, cushioning against the
worst possible losses.26 Another benefit for the markets is an increase in
liquidity and access to capital because credit default swaps allow banks to
pass on risk from making loans.27 Thus, banks retain less credit risk on
each loan than they otherwise would and are able to lend more money to
more businesses. 2 8 Credit derivatives are advantageous to both investors
and the markets as a whole. As such, the current benefits of and potential
increased participation in credit derivatives should be stressed when
considering regulation.
2. Current Regulation
Credit default swaps provide a good example of both the type and impact
of regulatory efforts in the credit derivatives market. In 2000, Congress
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act.2 9 The Act clarified that
"swap agreements," including credit default swaps, are not securities under
the federal securities laws. 30 A "swap agreement" is defined very broadly
and includes an agreement, contract, or transaction that "provides for any
purchase, sale, payment or delivery.., that is dependent on the occurrence...
of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic,
or commercial consequence." 31 Even though a credit derivative such as a
credit default swap would most likely fit this definition without further
clarification, Congress also specifically labels a "credit default swap" as a
swap agreement.32 Accordingly, the products are not subject to federal
securities law registration requirements.
23. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1019, 1023 (2007).
24. Id. at 1024. A risk profile refers to the combination of investments that create the
level of risk at which an investor is willing to be exposed. See generally Brealey et al., supra
note 4, at 147-73. Financial institutions, such as banks and broker-dealers, reported that the
largest use of credit default swaps was to "trade credit risk as part of an overall risk
management strategy." Fin. Insts., Fitch Ratings, supra note 10, at 7.
25. See Five Questions for Timothy Geithner on the Risk Watch at New York's Fed,
Institutional Investor, Mar. 2007, at 14, 14.
26. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1023-24; see also Have We Got to the Crisis
Nadir Yet?, Bus. & Fin., Sept. 28, 2007, at 16, 16.
27. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1024-25.
28. Id. at 1025.
29. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 (codified in scattered
sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
30. Id. § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2000)); id. § 303(a) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78c-1).
31. Id. § 301(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c note).
32. Id.
2008] 3099
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although the Commodity Exchange Act 33 broadly regulates derivative
products,34 credit default swaps are excluded swap transactions. They are
excluded because they are either (a) made between eligible contract
participants, are subject to individual negotiation by the parties, and are
executed over-the-counter 35 or (b) a credit risk, credit measure, or
occurrence out of the parties' control that is associated with a financial
consequence. 36
B. Hedge Funds
Credit derivatives can be used by any investor that can find a
counterparty willing to take the opposite side of a particular entity's credit
risk.37 Systemic risk is increased, however, when one of the parties is
capable of entering into massive numbers of these contracts without
disclosing any information. Accordingly, hedge funds are generally the
parties that present the greatest risk to the financial markets.
1. Overview
Hedge funds are private pools of capital that remain largely unregulated
in the United States, often borrow to enhance returns, and have managers
who are in large part compensated based on performance. 38 The global
hedge fund industry currently has about $1.4 trillion in assets under
management, 39 and it has experienced tremendous growth, about 3000% in
the last sixteen years.40 There are no restrictions on the type of trading
strategies and financial instruments hedge funds may use. Funds create and
make use of a variety of strategies, such as equity long/short, equity market
33. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (2000).
34. See id. § la(4) (defining "[c]ommodity" to include "all services, rights, and interests
in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in," thus covering
derivatives).
35. Id. § 2(g).
36. Id. § la(13).
37. See supra Part I.A.1.
38. See Kambhu et al., supra note 7, at 2-4; President's Working Group on Fin. Mkts.,
Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management 1 (1999)
[hereinafter President's Working Group], available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf; Rolling in It: Why Investors
Should Kick Up a Fuss About Hedge-Fund Fees, Economist, Nov. 18, 2006, at 75, 75.
39. This can only be estimated due to, inter alia, the lack of hedge fund registration
requirements. Estimates vary according to the calculation agent. See, e.g., Kambhu et al.,
supra note 7, at 7 (estimating total assets under management at $1.43 trillion); Marko
Maslakovic, Int'l Fin. Servs., London, Hedge Funds 1 (2007), available at
http://www.ifsl.org.uk/uploads/CBS HedgeFunds-2007.pdf (estimating total assets under
management at $1.5 trillion); QI 2007 Hedgefund.net (HFN) Hedge Fund Administrator
Study, Hedgefund.net, http://www.hedgefund.net/reports/admin-survey/adminStudy.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2008) (estimating total administered hedge fund assets at $2.267
trillion).
40. Ben Maiden, Why Fund Registration Could Miss Its Target, Int'l Fin. L. Rev., June
2006, at 16, 16.
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neutral, event-driven, convertible arbitrage, and global macro.4 1  In
addition, funds use a variety of financial instruments such as options,42
short selling,43 and derivatives. 44  Using these tools to pursue their
strategies, the more than 8000 hedge funds in the United States play a large
role in the financial markets.45 In the domestic market, they represent
eighty-nine percent of the trading in convertible bonds, sixty-six percent in
distressed debt, thirty-three percent in emerging market bonds, and thirty-
eight percent in credit derivatives.46
Hedge funds provide benefits to the economy by "mitigating price
downturns, bearing risks that others will not, making securities more liquid,
and ferreting out inefficiencies." 47  The most significant benefits are
providing liquidity and reducing the mispricing of assets. Simply by
actively trading and consistently updating their investment positions, 48
hedge funds create liquidity by increasing the number of buyers and sellers
in the markets. In a more complex way, hedge funds also "provide liquidity
to markets because they buy and sell assets against prevailing market
sentiment with the effect of mitigating temporary supply and demand
imbalances. '49 Basically, the hedge funds buy assets whose prices have
been driven down relative to the price of other related assets and
simultaneously sell relatively overvalued assets.50  Hedge funds also
41. See, e.g., Sam Kirschner et al., The Investor's Guide to Hedge Funds (2006)
(providing industry insiders' views and explanations of the most common hedge fund
strategies); William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. Empirical Fin.
309, 318-22 (1999) (providing summaries and general statistics on seven investment styles);
Rend M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 175, 180-82
(2007) (focusing on hedge funds' use of arbitrage and providing summary definitions of
several investment styles).
42. See Brealey et al., supra note 4, at 544; John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman,
Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 483-84 (6th ed. 2003) (defining an "option" as
the right to buy or sell within a specified period for a predetermined price and including puts
and calls in that definition).
43. See Downes & Goodman, supra note 42, at 631-32. "Selling short" is defined as the
sale of a futures contract the underlying asset of which the seller does not own. Id. The
seller borrows the underlying assets, sells them, and buys the same assets in the market at a
future date to pay back the lender. Id.
44. See id. at 173 (defining derivative generally as a contract whose value is based on
the performance of an underlying asset); Ross et al., supra note 4, at 714.
45. Kirschner et al., supra note 41, at 1.
46. Henny Sender & Anita Raghavan, Worry Amid Hedge Fund Boom: Privileged
Access to Information, Wall St. J., July 27, 2006, at Al. Interestingly, other researchers have
found it difficult to estimate the hedge fund industry's role in the credit derivatives market.
See Nomura Fixed Income Research, Nomura Sec. Int'l, Inc., Credit Default Swap (CDS)
Primer 2 (2004), available at
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/content/NomuraCDSPrimer 12May04.pdf.
47. Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, Regulation, Spring
2007, at 36, 36.
48. See President's Working Group, supra note 38, at D-5.
49. Id. at A-5; see also Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristics of Risk and
Return in Risk Arbitrage, 56 J. Fin. 2135, 2165, 2170-71 (2001) (demonstrating hedge
funds' impact in merger arbitrage as creators of liquidity).
50. President's Working Group, supra note 38, at A-5.
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"reduce the mispricing of financial assets that might occur across markets,
making markets more efficient."'51  Due to their flexible investment
strategies and ability to adapt to quickly changing market conditions, 52
hedge funds can make investments based upon mispriced risk or assets, 53
thereby pushing those prices closer to their true values.
Hedge funds may benefit the credit derivatives market specifically as
well. In fact, "[t]he [over-the-counter] market in credit derivatives is often
cited as a case in point where hedge funds play a critical role in market
liquidity. Indeed it is likely the case that market depth and bid-ask spreads
are improved by the participation of hedge funds." 54 Hedge funds play an
important role in the economy, and the benefits they provide should be
given prominence when contemplating further regulation.55
2. Current Regulation
Federal regulation of the hedge fund industry, including the use of credit
derivatives, is relatively light. Currently, only four federal statutes have the
potential to regulate hedge fund activity. Additionally, many hedge funds
as well as their managers take advantage of statutory exceptions to these
regulations.
51. Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the Banco de Mexico International Conference (Nov. 15, 2005),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200511152/default.htm.
52. Id.
53. If a hedge fund thinks an asset is priced higher than its true value, the fund can sell it
short. See Downes & Goodman, supra note 42, at 631-32. If a hedge fund thinks it is priced
lower than true value, the fund can buy it now and sell it when the price rises.
54. Randall Dodd, On the Hedge Fund Question: A Program of Reckless Complacency,
Fin. Pol'y Forum, Oct. 2006, http://www.financialpolicy.org/fpfspb29.htm.
55. Many economists, legal scholars, and financial analysts firmly hold the opposite
view that regulation is required to limit hedge funds' role in the markets. See Nathan J.
Greene, The SEC's Latest Hedge Fund Rulemaking: More Than 600 Comment Letters
Later, Banking & Fin. Services Pol'y Rep., July 2007, at 4, 7 (suggesting that possibly the
only thing certain about the debate over whether to regulate hedge funds is that the debate
itself will continue). The justifications for regulation are numerous. See, e.g., Andrew M.
Kulpa, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory
and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate Control and Governance, 6 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J.
4, 4 (2005), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article.aspid=582 (calling for further regulation of hedge
funds in the corporate governance context); Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson,
Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation
of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1, 19-20 (2007) (calling for limits on
hedge funds' use of leverage); Christopher Glynn, German Minister: Regulatory Push
'Vindicated,' HedgeFund.net, Sept. 4, 2007,
http://www.hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.aspx?story=7754 (noting politicians' view that
the subprime mortgage crisis that slowed the U.S. economy in 2007 is further evidence of
the need for hedge fund regulation). See generally Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt.,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (SEC), Statement by SEC Staff at Open Commission Meeting
Considering Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers (July 14,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071404pfr.htm (providing several justifications
for hedge fund regulation).
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The Securities Act of 193356 regulates domestic securities transactions
with the aims of protecting investors and promoting efficiency, competition,
and capital formation.57 To accomplish these goals, the Securities Act
requires issuers to register their securities so that there is full and fair
disclosure. 58 Even though hedge funds offer investors various types of
securities, 59 they often avoid the regulation requirements by offering their
securities privately.60 That is, they can offer securities to select, qualified
investors instead of selling common stock to the public.61
The Securities Exchange Act of 193462 requires, among other things, the
registration of brokers and dealers63 and the securities they sell on a
national exchange 64 with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). 65 The Exchange Act also requires issuers to register any class of
outstanding equity security if the issuer of such securities has $1 million of
total assets and a class of equity securities with more than 500 holders of
record.66 A registrant is then subject to further regulation, such as required
periodic reporting,67 restrictions on proxy solicitation, 68 and prohibitions
against insider trading. 69 Hedge funds are able to avoid the registration and
consequent requirements simply by having fewer than 500 investors. 70
While a hedge fund can avoid registration, other provisions may impose
regulation on some of a fund's activities. If a hedge fund acquires
beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class of registered
equity securities, it must file a beneficial ownership statement with the
SEC, the security's issuer, and any exchange on which the security is
traded.71 If a hedge fund meets the threshold as it invests, it must then
make the 13(d) or 13(g) filing. Additionally, a hedge fund will be required
to file quarterly reports regarding any account over which it exercises
investment discretion that holds registered equity securities and has an
aggregate fair market value of $100 million.72 Again, an unregistered fund
may meet a regulatory threshold thereby requiring disclosure of information
based on its investing activity.
56. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
58. Id. §§ 77e(c)-77f.
59. See id. § 77b(a)(1) (defining a broad range of issuances as securities).
60. Id. § 77d(2) (exempting transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering).
61. Id.; see also SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds 14 (2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
62. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000)).
63. Id. § 78o. For definitions of broker and dealer, see id. § 78c(a)(4)-(5).
64. Id. § 781.
65. Id. § 78d.
66. Id. § 781(g).
67. Id. § 78m.
68. Id. § 78n.
69. Id. § 780(0.
70. SEC, supra note 61, at 18-19.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (requiring a statement at the time when five percent is attained);
id. § 78m(g) (requiring a statement whenever the SEC prescribes).
72. Id. § 78m(f).
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Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 194073 to protect
investors further.74 It prohibits investment companies, 75 including hedge
funds, from engaging in transactions unless they register with the SEC. 76
However, hedge funds often elude registration by relying on one of two
exceptions to the definition of an investment company. If the hedge fund
maintains less than 100 investors77 or has only qualified investors that
purchase interests through private offerings, 78 it is not subject to the
regulation.
The Investment Advisers Act of 194079 also requires hedge fund
managers, as investment advisers, to register with the SEC.80 Yet a hedge
fund manager can again avoid registration by relying on the exceptions to
the definition of an investment adviser. As long as the manager has fewer
than fifteen clients in any year and does not work for an investment
company, the manager is not subject to the regulation.81 The critical point
for hedge fund managers is that, for the purposes of counting, only an
individual fund is a client and not the investors in the funds themselves.8 2
Even the largest of hedge fund managers do not usually run more than
fifteen funds at once.83
C. Systemic Risk
While systemic risk has no formal definition, it is generally understood
as the risk that the financial system as a whole will collapse. 84 A necessary
element of this risk is the potential of financial events to lead to substantial
adverse consequences in the real, global economy. 85 Credit derivatives and
hedge funds both contribute to systemic risk.
73. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000)).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b).
75. See id. § 80a-3 (defining investment companies).
76. Id. § 80a-7 (prohibiting transactions in interstate commerce by unregistered
investment companies).
77. See id. § 80a-3(c)(1).
78. See id. § 80a-3(c)(7).
79. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2000)).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.
81. Id. § 80b-3(b)(3).
82. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (vacating the hedge
fund rule that equated "client" to "investor" as arbitrary). See generally Registration Under
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279), invalidated by Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873 (attempting to
improve the SEC's ability to protect investors and securities markets by increasing the
number of hedge funds required to register).
83. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876.
84. See Anthony W. Ryan, Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Mkts., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Remarks Before the Managed Funds Association Conference (June 11, 2007),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp450.htm. Systemic risk is not the same as
systematic risk. Systematic risk is risk that is inherent in financial markets, which cannot be
avoided through diversification. See Ross et al., supra note 4, at 299; see also Brealey et al.,
supra note 4, at 162 & n.27.
85. See Kambhu et al., supra note 7, at 8.
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1. Overview
While there are numerous benefits to the widespread use of credit
derivatives, 86 and particularly credit default swaps, one drawback is
increased systemic risk. This increase comes mostly from the effect on
liquidity not only in the derivatives market but also in the broader credit
markets. While there are several definitions of liquidity, it can be
understood as "the ability to trade continuously in markets made up of
several competing dealers with reasonable two-sided bid-offer spreads
offering conventional trading volumes." 87  Due to the size of the credit
derivatives market, the network of parties within it, and its sensitivity to
liquidity shocks, it makes a substantial contribution to systemic risk.
Practically speaking, "[t]here is grave concern that if a number of [reference
entities] simultaneously experienced credit events, the [entire] system
would grind to a halt."'88
Several characteristics of the credit derivatives market constrain its
liquidity and hinder its ability to respond to liquidity shocks. First, many
derivatives are pay-as-you-go, such that credit losses are paid as they come
due and not reserved for in advance. 89 This increases the likelihood of a
default as funding might not be available when it is needed. 90 Numerous
defaults in a short period would then constrain liquidity in the credit
markets. Second, trading is concentrated in a small number of
counterparties. The top ten counterparties represented eighty-six percent of
the volume in credit derivatives trading in 200591 and the majority of the
trading is done by just four counterparties. 92 If just one of these reduces the
amount of liquidity it provides, then the whole market would feel the
effects. Third, the inherent structure of credit derivatives further links
financial entities as parties to the transactions-they are all protection
buyers, protection sellers, and reference entities. Because all the players are
taking on every role, there is an increased risk that "[b]ig losses in credit
derivatives could set off a chain reaction."93 For example, assume a hedge
fund buys a large amount of credit default swap protection from a bank. If
the reference entity defaults with no recovery, the bank must pay the entire
86. See supra Part I.A. 1.
87. Tim Weithers, Credit Derivatives, Macro Risks, and Systemic Risks, Fed. Res. Bank
of Atlanta Econ. Rev., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 43, 64.
88. Id.
89. See Edward Chilcote, Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Credit Derivatives and
Financial Fragility 2 (2006), available at http://www.levy.org/pubs/pn.l-06.pdf.
90. Id.
91. See Fin. Insts., Fitch Ratings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Indices Dominate
Growth as Banks' Risk Position Shifts 7 (2006), available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report-frame.cfm?rptid=291182 (login
required).
92. Weithers, supra note 87, at 64 (noting that the majority of the volume in credit
derivatives trading is done by JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Deutschebank, and Goldman
Sachs).
93. Mara Der Hovanesian et al., Taking Risks to Extremes: Will Derivatives Cause a
Major Blowup in the World's Credit Markets?, Bus. Wk., May 23, 2005, at 96, 96.
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amount of protection to the hedge fund. If the bank is unable to pay its
debts as a result, parties to credit default swaps with the bank as the
reference entity will come into play. The protection sellers of those
derivatives may have even been another bank. As more and more players
become involved, the likelihood of defaults increases. Furthermore, if a
counterparty to one of these large institutions terminates its derivative
contracts, there is a risk that a run will occur in which other counterparties
to the institution react by limiting their exposure.94 Thus, effect on liquidity
may not end with one player's impact on the availability of credit.
Hedge funds also contribute to systemic risk.95  Fund activity that
impacts "the ability of financial intermediaries or financial markets to
efficiently provide credit" creates risks to the entire financial system.96
Again, the focus is on liquidity. If a highly leveraged entity such as a hedge
fund is forced to liquidate, the market is forced to absorb the risks the fund
had assumed but of which the market was unaware. 97 The resulting
surprise price changes in the markets "can heighten uncertainty about credit
risk and disrupt the intermediation of credit. These . . .effects, if not
contained, could cause a contraction of credit and liquidity, and ultimately,
heighten the risk of a contraction in real economic activity. '98
The numerous effects to systemic risk can be seen from the example of a
hedge fund's decision to constrain liquidity by no longer taking contrarian
positions in the market.
Large dealers would be affected through losses on the part of leveraged
counterparties to which they have credit exposure and through losses on
their own market risk exposures. Losses on these exposures in turn can
lead to further risk aversion and liquidation of positions. Other
participants will find the liquidity of their balance sheets reduced, which
could lead to further fire sales or a reluctance to transact. Solvent but
suddenly illiquid market participants may default on their obligations. If
the disruption to markets lasts long enough, borrowing and lending for
real investment could be curtailed.99
This increase in systemic risk may actually be more significant as banks
take on greater exposure to credit derivatives. For example, Goldman
Sachs, a seemingly formidable company by any measure, has derivatives
exposure of more than $1 trillion in face value. ' 00
94. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 91, 94 (2005).
95. European Cent. Bank, Financial Stability Review 12 (2006) ("A disruptive asset
price adjustment could also be triggered by other financial sector shocks, such as the
possibility of an idiosyncratic collapse of a key hedge fund or a cluster of smaller
funds ....").
96. Kambhu et al., supra note 7, at 11.
97. President's Working Group, supra note 38, at 23.
98. Id.
99. Fin. Stability Forum, Update of the FSF Report on Highly Leveraged Institutions 12
(2007), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/HLIUpdate-
finalwithoutembargo 1 9MayO7.pdf.
100. On Top of the World, Economist, Apr. 29, 2006, at 11, 11.
3106 [Vol. 76
HEDGE FUNDS AND CREDIT DERIVATIVES
Hedge funds further contribute to systemic risk because they are subject
to contagion 0l1 : the phenomenon of significant economic changes to one
entity spreading, producing similar changes in other entities. 10 2 Applied to
hedge funds, it is the risk that several hedge funds will default or suffer
large losses at the same time. Thus, any effect a hedge fund has on liquidity
may be multiplied by the number of other funds holding the same positions
or using the same investment style. 1
03
Hedge funds' heavy use of credit derivatives further increases hedge
funds' potential to affect the credit markets and exacerbates any actual
influence. Because hedge funds do not need to own the underlying debt to
buy credit insurance on it, the value of the derivative can greatly exceed the
value of such debt. 104 Due to this leverage, a relatively small market
change could trigger a crisis as a vast array of interconnected contracts
creates serious liquidity problems.10 5 In other words, leverage works in the
negative direction just as quickly when the reference asset's value
decreases. 106
2. Long-Term Capital Management
Though the notion that hedge funds' use of credit derivatives increases
systemic risk may seem too hypothetical-possibly due to the lack of
transparency in the practice-to be of real risk, the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) provides a manifestation of the systemic
concerns. 107 The financial world feared that the collapse of LTCM, perhaps
101. See European Cent. Bank, supra note 95, at 142 (noting that the trend of hedge funds
taking increasingly similar positions is a "major risk for financial stability which warrants
close monitoring"); Nicole M. Boyson, Christof W. Stahel & Ren& M. Stulz, Is There Hedge
Fund Contagion? 31 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://ssm.com/abstract-884202 (providing statistical
evidence that poor performance by a hedge fund using one investment strategy is likely to be
associated with poor performance by all funds using that style as a whole).
102. See World Bank Group, Definitions and Causes of Contagion,
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definitions.ht
ml#broad (last visited Mar. 11, 2008) (defining contagion in the context of country-to-
country spillovers).
103. See Shadab, supra note 47, at 39.
104. The Ballooning Credit Derivatives Market: Easing Risk or Making It Worse?,
Knowledge@Wharton, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cftn?articleid = 1303.
105. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1040; see Philipp M. Hildebrand, Hedge Funds
and Prime Broker-Dealers: Steps Towards a "Best Practice Proposal," Fin. Stability Rev.
(Special Issue on Hedge Funds), Apr. 2007, at 67, 72, available at http://www.banque-
france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2007/etud7_O407.pdf.
106. See Tavakoli, supra note 11, at 55-59 (describing the relationship between banks
and hedge funds as counterparties in credit derivatives and the resulting uncertainties as to
risk distribution).
107. Id. See generally Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted
the Financial Markets 251-62 (2003). For a detailed and thorough story of what happened to
Long-Term Capital Management, see Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise
and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management (2000).
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the most cited hedge fund failure, 108 was. great enough to disrupt the
functioning of the capital markets as a whole.' 0 9 The hedge fund engaged
in a trading strategy that was highly leveraged and involved numerous
derivatives.' 10
The LTCM Fund's size and leverage, as well as the trading strategies that
it utilized, made it vulnerable to the extraordinary financial market
conditions that emerged following Russia's devaluation of the ruble and
declaration of a [default on its] debt .... Russia's actions sparked a
"flight to quality" in which investors avoided risk and sought out
liquidity. As a result, risk spreads and liquidity premiums rose sharply in
markets around the world. The size, persistence, and pervasiveness of the
widening of risk spreads confounded the risk management models
employed by LTCM .... []LTCM . . . suffered losses in individual
markets that greatly exceeded what conventional risk models, estimated
during more stable periods, suggested were probable. Moreover, the
simultaneous shocks to many markets confounded expectations of
relatively low correlations between market prices and revealed that global
trading portfolios like LTCM's were less well diversified than assumed.
Finally, the "flight to quality" resulted in a substantial reduction in the
liquidity of many markets, which, contrary to the assumptions implicit in
108. Other institutions besides hedge funds have also lost significant capital from the
misuse of derivatives. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 107, at 388-91 (describing how
American Express lost over $826 million on CDOs); Rochael M. Soper, Promoting
Confidence and Stability in Financial Markets: Capitalizing on the Downfall of Barings, 7
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 651, 652-54 (1997) (describing how a single trader's misuse of
derivatives bankrupted the oldest investment firm in England).
109. See Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
Financial Servs., 105th Cong. 19 (1998) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Operations] (statement of
William J. McDonough, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
[T]here was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would
experience extreme price moves and probably cease to function for a period of one
or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle. A loss
of investor confidence leading to a rush out of private credits, leading to a further
widening of credit spreads, leading to further liquidations of positions, and so on.
Most importantly, this would have led to further increases in the cost of capital to
American businesses.
Id.
110. The following is an abbreviated overview of the strategy employed by LTCM: The
fund believed that the premium an investor received for holding a risky position over a less
risky one would decrease around the globe, in which case the price of more risky debt would
rise while that of less risky debt would fall. To capitalize on this, LTCM took long positions
in bonds that it perceived to have a yield higher than necessary to justify holding the risk. It
hedged these positions against what it considered incredibly low interest rate risk with short
positions in derivatives on governments' debt, including Russia's. When Russia defaulted,
however, a "flight to quality," or flight to safety, ensued in which investors around the globe
fled to less risky investments, thereby increasing the risk premium that LTCM had bet would
decrease. Interest rates on treasuries fell, but the yields on the bonds on which LTCM had
taken a long position did not fall as much, resulting in losses on its hedges not matched by
the bonds. See Lowenstein, supra note 107, at 123-60; Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to
Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. I11.
L. Rev. 975, 984; Stulz, supra note 22, at 189-90.
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their models, made it difficult to reduce exposures quickly without
incurring further losses.' 1 1
The situation was so bad that the Federal Reserve organized a rescue of the
fund because it feared the possible extent of the consequences on the world
financial markets. 1" 2 LTCM's partners convinced them that the meltdown
was "potentially much worse than market participants imagined.", 13
The threat of another failure looms, and the losses may be larger. While
LTCM borrowed about 100 times its raised capital to hold derivatives worth
about 1000 times its raised capital,'14 there is even "'more borrowing by
hedge funds in an untested, illiquid credit market than has historically been
the case."'' 115
D. Efficient Capital Markets
The efficient capital markets hypothesis is a notion that has been defined
as the idea "that security prices accurately reflect available information and
respond rapidly to new information as soon as it becomes available."' 16 In
the courts, the theory most frequently arises in the context of securities
fraud claims pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.117 To state a claim, the plaintiff must show, among other things,
"that the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant's action caused injury to the
plaintiff."' 18 The plaintiff does not need to show an individual transaction
caused the alleged injury, though, if the defendant's alleged fraud is aimed
at the market as a whole. 119 This "fraud on the market" theory is "based on
the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of
a company's stock is determined by the available material information
regarding the company and its business." 120 Hence, "misrepresentations
defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of the stock's
[inherent] value.' 121
The foundation of "fraud on the market" must be efficient capital
markets. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the theory in Basic Inc. v.
111. President's Working Group, supra note 38, at 12.
112. Kevin Dowd, Too Big to Fail?: Long-Term Capital Management and the Federal
Reserve 1, 4-5 (Cato Inst. Briefing Papers No. 52, 1999), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubsibriefs/bp52.pdf.
113. Id. at 4.
114. See Hovanesian et al., supra note 93, at 96.
115. Id. (quoting Peter J. Petras of CreditSights Inc.).
116. Brealey et al., supra note 4, at 958. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970) (concluding that
the efficient markets model stands up well to empirical testing).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC]
may prescribe .... ).
118. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2000).
119. See, e.g., Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1990).
120. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986).
121. Id. at 1160-61.
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Levinson. 122 Basic was a publicly traded company that was the target of a
merger with Combustion Engineering, Inc. 123 During the negotiation
period, Basic's management made three public statements denying that it
was party to any merger negotiations. 124 Former Basic shareholders who
sold their stock after the first public statement and before the announcement
of the merger brought a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) for an
alleged violation of Rule lOb-5.125 In holding that the plaintiffs benefited
from the presumption of a reliance element, the Court stated that "the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all
publicly available information."' 126 This is a direct affirmation of the
efficient capital markets theory.
Inherent in the connection between information being available and the
price of the security reflecting such information is the role of traders in the
market for the security. Without enough investors acting on the
information, the price would remain unchanged. This critical process is
driven by investors' desire to make money (or lose less money than they
otherwise would). Traders looking to be the first to act on a change in an
investment's price, such that they can later profit when such a change
occurs, take the time and effort to become well-informed. 127 This allows
them to speculate more accurately as to the change in price. Once these
traders act, other less sophisticated investors attempt to identify the overall
market trend and trade in response to it. For example, if a number of
sophisticated traders learn enough information to predict that a company
will suffer losses, they are likely to sell their shares in that company in
order to avoid the fall in price. As a result, other traders are induced to sell
as they notice the selling. The end result is that the increased supply
coupled with the decreased demand for the shares causes the price of the
stock to fall. The investors make the market efficient because their trading
pushes the price of the stock to the point where it accurately reflects the
information that the company was likely to suffer losses. As such, well-
informed traders provide a crucial mechanism in efficient capital markets.
The Court in Basic assumed this link existed in accepting the presumption
of reliance for fraud on the market claims. It simply noted that "market
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
122. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
123. Id. at 226-27.
124. Id. at 227. As late as two months prior to the announcement of the agreed-upon
merger, a Basic shareholder report stated that "[w]ith regard to the stock market activity in
the Company's shares we remain unaware of any present or pending developments which
would account for the high volume of trading and price fluctuations in recent months." Id. at
228 n.4.
125. Id. at 228.
126. Id. at 246.
127. This practice is commonly referred to as "professionally informed trading." See
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 549, 569-72 (1984); see also Dennis S. Corgill, Insider Trading, Price Signals, and
Noisy Information, 71 Ind. L.J. 355, 396 (1996) (noting that those with informational
advantages can capture first-mover advantages in trading).
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statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices."'1 28 By
actively trading, "'the market is performing a substantial part of the
valuation process."' 29
Applied to credit derivatives, the idea of efficient capital markets predicts
that the price of a credit default swap accurately reflects and responds to
any relevant information. 130  An inherent assumption is that there is
information available to those parties entering into credit default swaps.
But, "'the market remains maddeningly opaque, even to insiders." ' 131 It
has even been argued that the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) has actively resisted making the market any more
transparent. 132 Given this lack of relevant information in the credit market,
traders cannot properly perform their function to create an efficient market.
Sophisticated traders are less informed than they could be because
information exists to which they have no access. Less sophisticated traders
are consequently following these decisions assuming they are informed,
where they are in fact relatively uninformed. The combination is that credit
derivatives are pushed to an inaccurate price.
It is the absence of quality information available to traders that constrains
liquidity and therefore increases systemic risk. If financial shock occurs
resulting in new information, the prices of credit default swaps could fall
dramatically and quickly as traders rapidly move to respond to the
previously absent information. This is very similar to the reaction in the
LTCM scenario. 133 The flight to quality was spurred by traders pushing
prices to reflect accurately the amount of risk in an investment. Applied
here, liquidity in the credit market will suffer and the entire system is
jeopardized as the financial markets lose access to credit. The absence of
quality information regarding the financial strength of credit derivative
trading partners is particularly concerning. The response to this previously
absent information will create the greatest chain effect as credit derivatives
market participants are often taking on several different roles at once.
134
128. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.24.
129. Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
130. There are several models for pricing credit default swaps; however, pricing is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Darrell Duffle, Credit Swap Valuation, Fin.
Analysts J., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 73; Patrick Houweling & Ton Vorst, Pricing Default Swaps:
Empirical Evidence, 24 J. Int'l Money & Fin. 1200 (2005).
131. Frank Partnoy & David Skeel, Credit Derivatives Play a Dangerous Game, Fin.
Times, July 17, 2006, at 17.
132. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1036 (arguing that ISDA's resistance to
providing access to credit derivatives documentation contributes to the "informational fog"
in the market).
133. See supra Part I.C.2.
134. See supra Part I.C.1.
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E. Corporate Bond Market: An Example of the Interplay Among
Disclosure, Efficient Capital Markets, and Liquidity
Corporate bonds are generically defined as long-term debt instruments of
a corporation. 135 Until recently, the secondary corporate bond market was
similar to the current credit derivatives market. Much of this is due to the
fact that both trade primarily over-the-counter. 136  Additionally, the
corporate bond market was one of the least transparent markets, with
neither pretrade nor posttrade disclosure requirements and no centralized
mechanism to collect and disseminate executed trade information. 137
Similar to the current situation with credit derivatives, there was a cry for
increased transparency through regulation. Arguments in support of
transparency included lower transaction costs from increased
competition, 138 a more level playing field for smaller players in comparison
to institutional investors, 139 enhanced disclosure of emerging risks to the
financial system,' 40 and improved liquidity as the result of participation of
new players and more regular trading of former players. 14 1 Of course, there
were counterarguments. One was the possible damage to liquidity from
opportunistic traders taking advantage of market makers and increased costs
of providing liquidity.' 42  Another counterargument was the alleged
existence of better suited solutions such as improved documentation and
investor education.143
The National Association of Securities Dealers agreed with the
transparency advocators and implemented the Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine, which is commonly referred to as TRACE. 144 TRACE
intends to increase transparency in the corporate bond market by providing
free, real-time prices on over-the-counter corporate bonds.145 The system
seeks to improve the secondary market in which these bonds are traded
135. See Stephen A. Ross et al., supra note 4, at 129.
136. Michael A. Goldstein et al., Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment
on Corporate Bonds, 20 Rev. Fin. Studies 235, 235 (2007); see supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
137. Goldstein et al., supra note 136, at 235.
138. See Jean-Pierre Casey, European Capital Mkts. Inst., Bond Market Transparency:
To Regulate or Not to Regulate ... 3 (2006), available at
http://shop.ceps.be/downfree.php?itemid=1 420.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at 5-6.
144. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) has since consolidated with
the member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the New York Stock
Exchange to create the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. See Order Approving
Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169 (July 26, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf.
145. NASD, TRACE Fact Book 2 (2006), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/reg-systems/documents/regulatory-systems/pO 1 8668.pdf.
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through disclosure. 146 The National Association of Securities Dealers
believes that, "[f]rom a regulatory standpoint, [increased] levels of
transparency better enable regulators to monitor the market, pricing and
execution quality."' 147  From investors' standpoint, "[b]y distributing
accurate and timely public transaction data, TRACE provides access to
reliable corporate bond information, thereby enhancing the integrity of the
market."' 148 By February 7, 2005, prices from about ninety-nine percent of
all secondary market corporate bond trades, representing about ninety-five
percent of the monetary value traded, were immediately disseminated to the
public. 149
The advent of TRACE in the corporate bond market provided the
opportunity to study the effects of increased disclosure on liquidity. There
was no financial shock. To the contrary, evidence suggests that liquidity in
the market actually increased because of lower transaction costs 150 without
an accompanied systemic decrease in market quality. 151 The reason for the
lower transaction costs is not as clear. One possible explanation is that
increased transparency "facilitate[s] better deterrence and detection of fraud
and manipulation."'152 Another explanation may be that more information
enables "improve[d] pricing efficiency and competition."' 153 The overall
impact of increased disclosure in the corporate bond market has thus been
increased liquidity without destroying traders' businesses. As such,
sophisticated traders are able to make informed decisions that perform the
function of properly pricing corporate bonds to reflect the relevant
information accurately. Parties to transactions can therefore rely on prices
before entering the contract and are not surprised by a shock afterwards.
Systemic risk is reduced as a dramatic shock is avoided because traders
have the information.
A parallel system for credit derivatives is plausible. Currently, private
research firms are working on methods to help mutual fund investors see
mutual funds' exposure to derivatives. 154 Private companies are also
offering electronic warehouse services that allow for a centralized, secure
infrastructure for processing posttrade obligations of over-the-counter
146. See generally Ross et al., supra note 4, at 16-17 (noting that secondary markets are
very important to corporations today).
147. NASD, supra note 145, at 2.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3; see also Amy K. Edwards et al., Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs
and Transparency, 62 J. Fin. 1421, 1422 (2007).
150. See Edwards et al., supra note 149, at 1450; Goldstein et al., supra note 136, at 237.
151. See Hendrik Bessembinder et al., Market Transparency, Liquidity Externalities, and
Institutional Trading Costs in Corporate Bonds, 82 J. Fin. Econ. 251, 253 (2006) (providing
statistical evidence that disclosure of corporate bond trades improved market quality).
152. See Edwards et al., supra note 149, at 1425.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Daisy Maxey, Morningstar to Include Derivatives Data, Wall St. J., Nov.
7, 2007, at C13.
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derivatives, such as payments, adjustments, and notices. 155 Combining
these services would provide a similar system of disclosure for credit
derivatives as TRACE provides for the bond market. 156
II. CONFLICT: THREE APPROACHES ON HOW TO REGULATE
The credit derivatives market currently poses a large systemic threat. It
is currently unclear what method of regulation, if any, is best suited to
reduce that risk given the characteristics of hedge funds' use of credit
derivatives. This part analyzes three approaches to regulation. Part II.A
presents several arguments for and against directly regulating the hedge
funds active in the credit derivatives market. Part II.B introduces some of
the support and opposition of required disclosure of the credit derivative
transactions. Part II.C discusses a number of the advantages and
disadvantages of allowing the hedge funds that use credit derivatives to
regulate themselves actively.
A. Entity Regulation
Used here, entity regulation refers to regulation that requires funds that
are active in the credit derivatives market to disclose the unique information
concerning their particular fund. Such disclosure may include the hedge
funds' positions, exposure to credit derivatives, or exposure to reference
entities.
1. The Advantages of Entity Regulation
The benefits of regulating the hedge funds themselves derive from the
goal of providing more information concerning the funds to both regulators
and investors. Information in the hands of the regulators may lead to
several benefits. In 2003, the SEC published a staff report that provided a
detailed study of hedge funds. 157 Citing the SEC's inability to detect fraud
and other misconduct at early stages without disclosure of fund
information, 158 the report suggested that mandatory registration would
allow for periodic examination that would create a threat of
investigation.' 59 Disclosure would also allow the SEC to observe directly
155. See, e.g., Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., Trade Information Warehouse,
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/suite/tradeinfo-warehouse.php (last visited Mar. 11,
2008) (offering a database for clients' executed trades that provides automatic "record
keeping, payment calculations and settlement, notional adjustments and contract term
changes" for the life of the derivative).
156. Of course, there are still operational issues that must be addressed before such a
system could operate smoothly enough to reduce systemic risk effectively. See, e.g., Chris
Kentouris, Putting an 'E' in Reconciliation: Automation Hasn't Fixed All Exceptions, but
the Urgency Persists, Sec. Industry News, Apr. 30, 2007, at 15 (describing the operational
issues still plaguing the electronic handling of over-the-counter derivatives).
157. SEC, supra note 61.
158. Id. at x, 76-79.
159. Id. at 92-93.
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and comprehensively hedge funds' trading activity, 160 making it "easier to
detect improper or illegal trading practices."' 61 That same information
would allow regulators to monitor the leverage of funds to identify possible
repeats of the LTCM collapse and take action to avoid them. Additionally,
regulators such as the SEC would be in a better position to develop
regulatory policy that is capable of adapting to the growing financial
sector. 162
Additionally, information in the hands of investors may allow them to
evaluate their investments more accurately. 163 In 1999, Representative
Richard H. Baker introduced a bill in the House of Representatives seeking
to achieve these benefits: the Hedge Fund Disclosure Act. 164  The bill
would have required that unregulated hedge funds with $3 billion under
professional management provide nonproprietary information concerning a
fund's assets, leverage ratios, derivatives positions, and measures of risk to
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 165 The premise of
the bill was that the discipline that market participants provide is only
effective if they have the necessary information. 166 As such, government
regulation cannot impose discipline, but it can enhance the effectiveness of
market discipline by insuring an environment of transparency. 167 By
requiring the funds to disclose information about themselves, "market
participants [can] make better, more informed judgments about market
integrity and creditworthiness of borrowers and counterparties."' 168
Additionally, trading by informed investors is a tenet of the efficient
capital markets theory. Providing investors with information allows them
to increase the efficiency of the market by pushing the price to a more
intrinsic value through trading. 169 In entity regulation, the disclosure of
fund information may allow traders to price the investments made by the
funds more accurately. Informational shocks are therefore less likely and
systemic risk is reduced.
Disclosure of information concerning hedge funds may actually benefit
the funds themselves. Funds inherently need money to operate. Giving
more information to investors that allows them to better understand their
160. Id. at 94-95.
161. Id. at 95.
162. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279), invalidated by Goldstein
v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
163. SEC, supra note 61, at 99-100.
164. Hedge Fund Disclosure Act, H.R. 2924, 106th Cong. (1999).
165. Id. §§ 3-4.
166. H.R. 2924-The Hedge Fund Disclosure Act: Hearing on H.R. 2924 Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 106th Cong. 10 (2000) [hereinafter H.R. 2924-
The HFDA] (statement of Lewis A. Sachs, Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets,
Department of the Treasury; Member, President's Working Group on Financial Markets).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski).
169. See supra Part I.D.
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investment 70 alleviates those investors' concerns that their money will be
lost.171  This is especially pertinent to institutional investors "who are
increasingly turning to hedge funds. . . [and] demand greater transparency
than individual investors." 172  Thus, though there are costs to disclosing
such information, hedge funds may find the resulting transparency is a net
benefit. 173
2. The Disadvantages of Entity Regulation
First, there will likely be numerous costs, monetary and otherwise, of the
disclosure of information by hedge funds. The funds themselves will face
increased administrative costs to meet any enacted requirements and
therefore ensure they are operating legally. Any government body assigned
the task of gathering and processing information will also face increased
costs. For example, if the SEC were so charged, some fear the agency is
too small and underfunded in its current state to monitor the industry
effectively. 174 The cost of becoming capable has been viewed as "a
significant and unnecessary burden on the SEC."'1 75 There are greater costs
on the financial markets as a whole. The greatest cost may be the
subsequent flight of funds to other jurisdictions with less regulation.' 76
Fewer market participants may reduce the benefits to efficiency and
liquidity resulting from hedge funds' presence in the market. 177 It may also
increase systemic risk as regulators lose an opportunity to create
transparency.1 78 Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve
and noted economist, has questioned the effectiveness of entity regulation,
stating that, "Any direct U.S. regulations restricting their flexibility will
doubtless induce the more aggressive funds to emigrate from under our
jurisdiction.... If the funds move abroad, our oversight will diminish.' 179
A second drawback is that hedge funds may not be willing to disclose the
type of information traders need to price investments accurately. In fact,
hedge funds and their managers have the reputation of being "a secretive lot
170. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68.
171. See Shadab, supra note 47, at 41.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Carol E. Curtis, Hedge Fund Regulation Looms, Sec. Industry News, Mar. 8,
2004, at 1.
175. McMillan Binch LLP, SEC Report on Hedge Funds-Staff Recommendations 2
(2003).
176. See Jacob Preiserowicz, Note, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has
the SEC Gone down the Wrong Path?, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 807, 842 (2006).
177. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing how hedge fund activity increases liquidity and
efficiency in the financial markets).
178. See Perrie Weiner & Gregg Zucker, Hedge Fund Regulation: Enough Already,
Forbes, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/opinions/2007/04/13/hedge-fund-regulation-
op-ed-cx pw 0413hedge.html.
179. Hedge Fund Operations, supra note 109, at 26 (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
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who zealously guard even the most basic information."' 180  If the
information is not made available, systemic risk is not reduced. Many
hedge funds fear that entity regulation is actually a backdoor method of
compelling funds to disclose their trading positions and portfolios. 18 1
Given the significance of this information to the success of each individual
hedge fund,182 it is likely that hedge funds will do their best to avoid any
possible reverse engineering.' 83 This may lead to hedge funds complying
with regulation, but doing so in a manner that results in uniform disclosure
across the industry. The risk is that all of the hedge funds disclose
information, but the information that becomes available is so similar that it
is of little use. Consequently, systemic risk may remain unaltered and the
regulation is essentially ineffective.
The notion of an investor, such as a hedge fund, suffering financially
from the disclosure of its position in a market was recognized by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Caiola v. Citibank.'84 In Caiola,
an investor alleged that Citibank committed securities fraud.' 85 Louis
Caiola became one of Citibank's largest customers by regularly trading
hundreds of thousands of shares of Philip Morris Companies, Inc., valued at
millions of dollars. 186 To hedge against losses from these trades, Caiola
simultaneously entered into option contracts with Citibank corresponding to
his stock positions.' 87 As his trades increased in size, he and Citibank
became concerned that the volume of options necessary to hedge effectively
could disclose his positions in the stock. 188 The fear was a "footprint[]" on
the market created by the impact on the stock's price.189 Other investors
could reverse engineer his positions to establish his trading strategy. They
could then either copy the strategy or take the opposite strategy, both
180. Kara Scannell, Making Hedge Funds Less Secret: SEC's Registration Requirement
Provides a New, Insider's Look; That Old Underage-Driving Case, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 2006,
at Cl.
181. Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 1, 38 (2006).
182. See supra Part I.B. 1.
183. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (defining reverse
engineering as "starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process
which aided in its development or manufacture"). See generally Pamela Samuelson &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575
(2002) (analyzing the accepted practice of reverse engineering products).
184. 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002). As Caiola v. Citibank involved an appeal by the
plaintiff of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepted the facts as
pled in plaintiffs complaint. Id. at 315.
185. Id. at 319.
186. Id. at 315.
187. Id. Louis Caiola bought put options from Citibank. A put option is a contract where
the buyer has the right, but not the obligation, to sell the underlying security in the future at a
predetermined time and price. See Brealey et al., supra note 4, at 544. Used in this case, the
put options had a strike price below the price at which Caiola bought the Philip Morris stock.
If the price fell below the strike price, Caiola would be able to sell the stock thus limiting the
amount of money he would lose to the difference between the strike price and price at which
he bought the stock.
188. Caiola, 295 F.3dat 315.
189. Id.
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effective techniques for the copier but detrimental for Caiola (and all large
investors). 190 For hedge funds, the fear of entity regulation is similar; with
some of a fund's information disclosed, others may be capable of
discerning the fund's strategy.
B. Transaction Regulation
Used here, transaction regulation refers to regulation that requires
disclosure of information regarding the specific credit derivative contracts
into which hedge funds and other parties enter. Such disclosure would
likely include at a minimum the price of the credit derivative, the reference
entity, and the reference asset. Disclosure may also include the identities of
the protection buyer and seller.
1. The Advantages of Transaction Regulation
Again, the benefits of transaction regulation derive from the disclosure of
more information. The information produced, though, is different.
Disclosure of the transactions themselves produces less information than
disclosure of the entities. With information being provided by banks in the
form of financial statements, 191 Call Reports, 192 and market surveys, 193
there may be no need for a large amount of information from hedge funds.
Some suggest that new "disclosure requirements should take into account
the endogenous production of information" already within the credit
derivatives market so as to maximize the marginal benefit of legally
required disclosure. 194 Regulating the transactions may provide regulators
and investors with information they can use without overburdening the
funds.
Another benefit of transaction regulation is the potential to shed light on
the highly intertwined nature of hedge funds' use of derivatives.1 95 By
making available some of the characteristics of executed credit derivatives,
third parties could gauge the market for the instruments as a whole.
Required disclosure of the reference entity, reference obligation, fixed rate
payer, and floating rate payer196 could provide regulators with enough
190. All investors, including Caiola, intend to take advantage of price discrepancies in
order to make a gain. See Stulz, supra note 41, at 180 (discussing arbitrage). Those who
copy Caiola's strategy push the price closer to its true value, lessening the gain Caiola can
make. Those who undertake the opposite strategy push the price further down, reducing the
value of Caiola's position. Both effects are detrimental to Caiola.
191. See Andr& Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives in
the United States and Europe, 5 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 149, 188-91 (2000).
192. Id. at 191-92.
193. See 2006 Year-End Market Survey, supra note 2.
194. See Stephen Brown et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence
from Hedge Fund Registration (Int'l Ctr. for Fin. at Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
06-15, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-918461.
195. See supra Part I.C.1.
196. See ISDA, 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions 6-11 (2003).
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information to foresee the potential impact of a financial shock by
displaying the connections among parties.197
Transaction regulation can also be used to prevent surprise impacts or
shocks in the financial markets by disclosing the large stakes that hedge
funds may take in other entities. This may be done in a manner analogous
to the beneficial ownership reporting requirements applicable to hedge
funds. 198 If a credit derivative results in exposure to a reference entity that
constitutes five percent or more of a hedge fund's total exposure, regulators
and market participants would benefit from knowing the contract exists.
While Congress intended the requirements under sections 13(d) and 13(g)
to provide notice of stock accumulation to avoid surprise hostile
takeovers, 199 similar requirements on credit derivative transactions would
provide notice to regulators of the increased systemic risk.
More importantly, such requirements would provide notice to investors
of the price of the reference obligation. "To the extent the pricing of credit
default swaps is disclosed or available to the market, it provides an
additional source of market-based information about a company's financial
health." 200 With this information, sophisticated traders would be able to
push the reference entity's debt to its accurate price. This would prevent
dramatic repricing and the resulting chain reaction, thereby reducing
systemic risk.201  Additionally, there are already potential outlets for
disseminating this information into the market, such as national stock
exchanges. 202
2. The Disadvantages of Transaction Regulation
One drawback of transaction regulation is the fear that nonparties to the
credit derivatives would be able to reverse engineer the contracts. 20 3 While
this can be mitigated by a central authority aggregating the information
before publishing it, that takes time.204 Not only does time reduce the value
of the information, it also reduces ability to address liquidity concerns in the
197. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 71.
199. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1711, at 2-6 (1968); see also S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 2-6
(1968).
200. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1026.
201. See supra Part I.D.
202. See Shane Kite, Regulators Reach Out to NYSE; Credit Derivatives Transparency
Project Possible: Participants Say Solution Should Come from Private Market, Sec.
Industry News, Feb. 4, 2008, at 1 (noting that the SEC and Treasury Department have
discussed the possibility of posting quotes and trades of credit derivatives on the New York
Stock Exchange). It should be noted that the general notion of managing systemic risk
presented by the credit derivatives market through public disclosure of derivatives pricing, as
presented here, is precisely the ultimate recommendation this Note intends to substantiate.
See infra Part III.B.
203. See supra note 183.
204. See Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16,
2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechibemanke20060516a.htm.
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market as new derivatives have been entered into and possible failures have
occurred.205
Another drawback of requiring disclosure of the credit derivatives hedge
funds use is the possibility of creating moral hazard. Moral hazard is the
possibility that "those who are insured against certain risks have an
incentive to use less than optimal care to avoid those risks. ' 206 Here, by
requiring disclosure of transactions to regulators, hedge funds'
counterparties may reduce their vigilance of the funds' risks and positions
when they enter the credit default swap.207 The counterparties simply
believe that the regulators are providing some form of insurance against
hedge fund malfeasance; therefore, they can do less due diligence while
taking on the same risk as if they had done a full investigation. This may in
fact increase systemic risk as parties enter contracts they otherwise would
not.
Transaction regulation may also be ineffective due to the decoupling of
economic and voting ownership. In some derivatives, the ability to direct a
vote arising from the reference asset is transferred between parties. Hedge
funds commonly include this provision in their derivatives. 20 8 Termed
"hidden (morphable) ownership" by Professors Henry Hu and Bernard
Black, hedge funds can use a derivative to gain indirect economic
ownership of a reference asset and informal voting power.209 This unique
ownership is acquired because the structure of the derivatives allows the
hedge fund to avoid beneficial ownership disclosure requirements. 210 The
fund is then capable of acquiring votes quickly, but such action would
likely occur before regulators could respond to the increase in systemic
risk.21" Therefore a financial shock may send ripples that regulators or
investors could not predict.212 The concern is that transaction regulation
may not capture all of the credit derivative exposure intended. It should be
noted that this does not directly affect the accurate pricing of a credit
derivative in the market.213 With this caveat in mind, it is difficult to
205, Id.
206. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L.
Rev. 65, 67-68. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L.
Rev. 237 (1996) (attempting to analyze the notion of moral hazard as ubiquitous in all areas
of law).
207. Bernanke, supra note 204.
208. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 815 (2006). See generally Anish
Monga, Note, Using Derivatives to Manipulate the Market for Corporate Control, 12 Stan.
J.L. Bus. & Fin. 186 (2006).
209. Hu & Black, supra note 208, at 816.
210. Id. at 819. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000) (setting forth the five percent
ownership threshold).
211. Hu & Black, supra note 208, at 818 (stating that the entire process often goes unseen
by nonparties).
212. Id. at 819 (noting that the scale of hidden morphable ownership is unknown).
213. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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predict the effect of morphable ownership on liquidity in a system of
transaction regulation.
C. Self-regulation
Used here, self-regulation refers to hedge funds that use credit derivatives
providing non-governmental regulation of themselves. The determination
of what actions are to be taken to reduce systemic risk would be left to the
hedge funds themselves. This form of regulation would require
collaborative action by hedge funds that has not yet been realized by their
current efforts. 214
1. The Advantages of Self-regulation
One benefit of self-regulation is that players in the credit derivatives
market can make preventative efforts. Some argue that required disclosure
of funds' exposures, positions, or strategies is unnecessary because the
hedge funds themselves are in the best position to make changes that will
reduce systemic risk.215 Thus, self-regulation allows the hedge funds to
develop practices and strategies that are aimed at preventing financial
shocks, not simply applying immediately necessary quick fixes.216 Hedge
funds best understand how they use credit derivatives; therefore they are in
the best position to foresee potential issues.
Another benefit of self-regulation is that it is not limited to U.S. borders.
"In the new international economy, regulation has to transcend national
financial 'streets.' Unavoidably, it has vaulted to the macroeconomic
plane." 217 Thanks to hedge fund activity and credit derivatives, "risk has
been spread throughout the global financial infrastructure." 218 Regulation
by the hedge funds themselves would not be limited to any single
jurisdiction, but could have benefits in every jurisdiction in which the funds
operate. 219
214. This is not to say that some hedge funds have not made any attempts at collaborative
effort. See, e.g., Managed Funds Ass'n, Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers (2007),
available at http://www.managedfunds.org/downloads/Sound%20Practices%202007.pdf
(providing hedge funds with peer recommendations for internal policies, practices and
controls).
215. See generally Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO
Identity Crisis, 1 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 317, 319-23 (2007) (describing the benefits
of "self-awareness" in self-regulation).
216. See John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct
Regulatory Intervention: A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 Buff. L. Rev. 1371
(20c).
217. John Eatwell & Lance Taylor, Global Finance at Risk: The Case for International
Regulation, at xii (2000).
218. Have We Got to the Crisis Nadir Yet?, supra note 26, at 16.
219. See generally Int'l Fin. Servs., London, Hedge Funds: City Business Series 1-3
(2007), available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/uploads/CBS-Hedge Funds_2007.pdf
(describing the geographical distribution of hedge funds).
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Self-regulation would also allow funds to decide who should be
disclosing what information and when. Many argue that effective
regulation does not require disclosure from every hedge fund, only the
largest hedge funds. 220  The most common support offered for this
argument is that only the largest funds-as measured by total assets-
legitimately increase systemic risk, because only their failure can
substantially affect the broader system.221 Self-regulation would allow
hedge funds to decide if this objective fund trait-a minimum amount of
assets under management-is the best determinant for which funds should
disclose information or if other characteristics of hedge funds would create
more suitable disclosure. Hedge funds are more likely to know their
individual businesses and the credit markets in which they operate better
than regulators; therefore the funds can more effectively choose what
information should be disclosed to reduce systemic risk.
2. The Disadvantages of Self-regulation
One drawback of self-regulation is the likelihood of collective action
problems. Hedge funds, like members of any group, make rational
decisions as to how much effort to expend in order to achieve a given result.
In response to trade assignment and confirmation backlog issues across the
credit derivatives market in 2005, the Federal Bank of New York was
required to step in to spur change by the market players. 222 Dealers of these
transactions "recognized the current weaknesses of their methods and were
desirous of change. However, no individual [player] could have unilaterally
adopted procedures without the cooperation of the broader group." 223 The
necessary changes to hedge funds' use of credit derivatives to reduce
systemic risk may not be achievable with self-regulation alone.
Another drawback is the fact that ISDA is currently in the best position to
provide self-regulation, and it possesses a level of monopolistic power.224
A main mission of ISDA is "[p]romoting practices conducive to the
220. See Fin. Servs. Auth., Hedge Funds: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory
Engagement 40-41 (2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp05O04.pdf
(arguing that since "only some hedge funds are having a significant market impact in
isolation . . . it could be logical to . . . increase continuous supervisory oversight just in
relation to those hedge fund managers whose funds and business model have a significant
market impact").
221. -I.R. 2924-The HFDA, supra note 166, at 19 (statement of Lewis A. Sachs,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, Department of the Treasury; Member, President's
Working Group on Financial Markets).
222. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding Meeting on
Credit Derivatives (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2005/an050915.html.
223. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks Before the Brooklyn Law School
Symposium on the Structure of Securities Markets (Nov. 10, 2006),
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch 111006aln.htm.
224. ISDA represents over 800 participants in 55 countries in the over-the-counter
derivatives industry. ISDA, About ISDA, http://www.isda.org (follow "About ISDA"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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efficient conduct of the business, including the development and
maintenance of derivatives documentation." 225  Seemingly an impartial
goal, the efforts to achieve it have caused concern. Some worry that
ISDA's standardized documentation and approaches benefit ISDA members
at the expense of others through the redistribution of resources,
informational asymmetries, or negative externalities. 226 Others worry that
ISDA has gained control of the creation of legal rules applicable to
derivatives. For example, "[t]o reduce the uncertainty associated with
government interpretations of the ISDA Master Agreement, [the most
important ISDA documentation,] ISDA has sought from thirty-four nations
supporting legislation and regulatory opinions confirming the enforceability
of certain provisions." 227 This control over the legal rules may allow
derivatives to be written to accommodate dealer-to-dealer transactions,
leaving end users at a disadvantage.228
III. RESOLUTION
A. Transaction Regulation Provides the Most Appropriate Disclosure
Given the characteristics of each approach to regulation, the best choice
in order to reduce the systemic risk generated by hedge funds' use of credit
derivatives is transaction regulation. In other words, the level of risk that a
financial event will lead to a crippling of the real economy is best reduced
through disclosure of the credit derivatives to which hedge funds are
parties. Transaction regulation is the most appropriate method for three
reasons. First, it provides information to those who need it, market
participants, without providing an easy target for reverse engineering.
Second, it is the quickest method of disseminating information in a rapidly
moving market. Third, it avoids the drawbacks of self-regulation.
To reduce systemic risk, information regarding credit derivatives players
and contracts must be available in the market. Only when traders have
access to the information can they make markets more efficient.229 Without
it, prices are inaccurate and the consequent risk of a financial shock looms.
But, when that information is proprietary and significant to the success of
the ones providing it,230 the amount and type of disclosure is fundamental
to both compliance and the maintenance of the market. By disclosing the
terms of the credit derivatives into which hedge funds enter, a third party
can identify what types of obligations are being referenced, what
225. ISDA, ISDA Mission, http://www.isda.org (follow "About ISDA" hyperlink; then
follow "Mission" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
226. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1037.
227. Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY. The Four Horsemen of Derivatives
Regulation?, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 213, 217 (Robert E. Litan
& Richard Herring eds., 2002).
228. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 23, at 1039.
229. See supra Part I.D.
230. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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counterparties are connected and how, and what trends are emerging in
various contract terms. 231 If that third party is a regulator, this information
allows for the detection of potential crises without imposing a great burden
on hedge funds. Funds' trading strategies remain confidential, as credit
derivatives are only one aspect of their portfolios. More importantly, if that
third party consists of investors interested in buying or selling credit default
swaps, the disclosed information allows for efficient capital markets to
operate. As such, market participants are able to push the price of the
protection against a default of the reference entity to reflect the disclosed
information more accurately. 232 Entity and self-regulation may provide
information, but it is not of the type that concerns accurate pricing. The real
risk is that a massive repricing will occur when new information hits the
market. Knowing how exposed a fund is to a dramatic repricing only
signifies how much will be lost; such knowledge does not prevent or
mitigate the loss.
In addition to providing the most influential information, transaction
regulation allows for the quickest dissemination of information. In a
market where a majority of confirmations are now being executed
electronically and some traders are nothing more than computers executing
algorithms, 233 the additional step of reproducing some of the terms in a
public forum would not be difficult or time consuming. This immediate
process makes the information more valuable to regulators attempting to
stifle financial shocks before they can cause a chain reaction. Furthermore,
other credit derivatives users and dealers are no longer exposed to long time
periods in which the price of the contract is not equal to its value because
information is not available to them. When information is made available
quickly, the price of the credit derivative is prevented from drastically
deviating from its inherent value.
While self-regulation has certain advantages, transaction regulation can
provide essentially the same benefits without collective action problems or
monopolistic actions on the part of hedge funds. First, the advantages are
similar. As there would be only a small impact on the costs of complying
with transaction regulation,234 funds would likely not benefit greatly from
changing jurisdictions. In fact, cross-border disclosure may be increased
more as counterparties throughout the world are exposed to the credit
derivative information. In addition, transaction regulation--described
above as fast and applying to limited information 235-remains a viable
method of preventing the market from becoming illiquid because it too is
proactive, much like self-regulation.236 The core theory in monitoring only
231. See supra Part I.A. 1.
232. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., supra Part I.E.
235. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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the largest, most active funds237 is present in transaction regulation as well.
The largest funds would inevitably contribute the most information to the
market. Thus, their activity becomes a main driver in accurately pricing
credit derivatives.
Furthermore, the drawbacks of self-regulation can be avoided. Collective
action is less of a problem with transaction regulation because it is
beneficial for each party to act individually. 238 The more contractual
information available, the more accurate the price. A hedge fund that
discloses information is actually helping itself by contributing to the pool of
information on which everyone can price the credit derivative. The
possibility that ISDA would take advantage of its prominent position in the
market for credit derivatives, 239 intentionally or unintentionally, is severely
reduced because there would be no requirement for ISDA even to
participate. The group may still impose on its members requirements
associated with disclosing transaction specific information, but it is unlikely
that the group could do enough to prevent efficient capital markets from
operating. 240
B. Recommendation
A system similar to TRACE ought to be created to disseminate credit
derivative transactions data. Such data can be produced in a timely manner
and with little burden on hedge funds, helping to fill in the current shortage
of significant information. The increase in systemic risk by hedge funds'
use of credit derivatives arises mostly from the informational shock to the
financial markets; when previously unavailable information concerning a
reference asset or reference entity hits the market, it has the potential to
cause prices to fall drastically and quickly.
A system parallel to TRACE would prevent this type of shock because
there would be no time period in which traders would be trading without
information. In more concrete terms, the chances are reduced that a hedge
fund that is party to large numbers of credit derivatives will lose a
significant amount of money when an informational shock hits the financial
markets. Quite simply, this is because no one would be the counterparty to
such a contract with the hedge fund in the first place. No party would enter
the contract because parties would be informed as to the accurate price due
to other trading activity in the market. The markets are therefore more
likely to remain liquid, the need for an active role for regulators is limited,
and systemic risk is effectively reduced.
237. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part I.D.
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CONCLUSION
Individually, credit derivatives and hedge funds are incredibly valuable to
the financial markets and will continue to be so. The confluence of the two,
however, significantly increases the risk that the financial system as a
whole will suffer a drastic setback from a single shock. In the rush to
mitigate this enormous risk, perhaps regulators have overlooked the
simplest solution. Transaction regulation provides the appropriate parties
with the appropriate information. Knowing the terms of credit derivatives
in the market, investors can properly price future credit derivatives and
consequently prevent the setup of a financial shock. If the gap between the
price and the value is minimized, there is a greatly decreased chance of a
drastic repricing chain reaction.
